Tuesday, October 25, 2011

How Technical Analysis helps when Fundamental Analysis cannot. A look at Amazon's earnings miss.

This afternoon after the market closed Amazon reported earnings that were well below expectations. Guidance also was lowered with a potential negative earnings in the 4th quarter as part of that theme. As a result no doubt there will be countless analysts coming out tomorrow and this week to lower Amazon's price target and/or their recommendations. Most of these analysts had price targets well above today's pre-announcement price of $227.15 and almost all had buy ratings (most of the others that did not, had hold ratings). I didn't come across any "sells". I mean who saw this coming?!?!?! Amazon had been one of the cream of the crop stocks over the past few years with its "cloud computing" stronghold (forget its 70+ forward P/E and 27% average annual earnings growth expectations. Right now Amazon's price is below $200 @ $199.01 as of 6pm central time. Can you chalk this one up as anything besides a massive fail by wall street analysts??? This seems to be a theme that continues to play itself out year after year when dealing with fundamental analysts. I would be very interested in studying the amount of luck (Beta) that the analysts benefit from versus the analysts that go against the market's beta and go out on a limb to actually predict something.

Every earnings season this is the typical charade. Analysts have price targets and if the company reaches that price target, the analysts increase their target price; if the company's price becomes too far below that target, they lower the price target (almost always after a major setback in price when it is too late for you). Essentially the analysts are backing into the price that the market sets by adjusting multiples, etc in the models to get to the current price, with a typical "buy" premium. They basically let the market tell them how to plug their models so that they can give never-ending buy/hold signals to their customers.

To me the best way to describe it is the infamous chicken and egg scenario. What/who is really predicting the price? Are the analysts actually predicting the stock's price or are they more or less just following the stock's price? Time and time again it seems they are just followers, like the rest of us. They assume the market is always right and efficient. That is the main problem with fundamental analysis. That is why you rarely see a price target significantly lower (or higher) than current prices (usually within a 1-2 standard deviation range), yet time and time again this strategy is wrong, often during major inflection points (like tonight with Amazon).

However, technical analysis can be used to help identify such points in time when analysts are likely too bullish and should scale back their estimates. The amazon chart below shows a very nice ending diagonal triangle. This is a technical pattern that occurs at the end of bull trends. It shows weaker and weaker momentum as price struggles to make higher highs. This pattern showed overlap in all the down moves into previous major price high territory. Where I have labeled 2 and 4 both encroached (greatly) on the 1 and 3 price highs. This shows major overlap and lack of conviction in the uptrend. There are other structural points with an ending diagonal, such as the 3 wave moves I have labeled A and B that help to identify this structure, as well.

Below the price chart are two measures of momentum, the relative strength and the MACD. The RSI (relative strength) shows the difference between changes in today's price versus a set period in the past. This helps identify the slowing of momentum, or the second derivative of price. The MACD is the Moving Average convergence/divergence and show the difference between trailing moving averages of the price. This helps show the difference above and below historical average prices. It too shows relative strength signs. Both of these indicators topped out on the way to the Sept $244 top. Notice that the $246 top coincided with both an RSI and MACD that peaked lower than where they were during the $244 top. This was a major warning sign, especially when price fell back below $235.

Another piece to the puzzle was the volume. Volume tells you a ton! For instance on most of the up moves, volume would decline from the initial thrust to the top such as the lower volume in the first half of September versus the higher volume at the end of August. Volume also helped to show the bottoms, with it usually weaker near the bottoms with a pickup when buying started.

Finally, we can use volume to help us find support areas. Notice on the left the "Volume by Price". This helps show that in the $190-$200 area, there has been a lot of volume. This is where the majority of people bought (and sold). This also is likely where a lot of people will "breakeven". I expect it to show support during this pullback on earnings. It may even provide another buying opportunity for the rebound that will likely occur to backtest the 2 to 4 trendline in the $215-$220 range. Notice too that there was relatively little volume at the peaks in price and above $200. To me this shows more interest in AMZN at the $200 price than at the $240 price.

Amazon is a great example of why I trust technical analysis more than fundamental analysis. Fundamental analysis helps provide a rear view mirror as to why price did such things, but technical analysis can help get you in front of that trend and help raise red flags in price action. After all, at the end of the day, the price action is what makes you money, not the company's fundamentals or some analysts's backed into expectations.

Thursday, October 13, 2011

MTA webcast series summary: The LongWave

I decided I will start capturing the notes I take during webcasts or meetings I attend that are relevant to this blog's purpose.

Below is a summary I sent in email form on the webcast I just attended concerning the LongWave presented by Ian Gordon of the LongWave Group. Typically there are also slides that accompany the presentation. If you are interested in these or have other questions, please contact me and I will send to you directly...keep in mind that these are notes I took as a 3rd party and are the presenter's thoughts, not necessarily mine.

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Today I had the pleasure of listening to a webcast of the Longwave theory (also known as the Kondratieff Wave) which has to do with generational economic cycles. This theory was first proposed by a Russian Economist (Kondratieff in the early 20th century) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nikolai_Kondratiev and is pretty famous, especially because it's expectations are playing out in similar time frames and because it analyzed back to the 1700's and the beginning of the US and continues to play out.

This theory breaks an economic period into 4 seasons (Spring -rebirth, Summer -growth, Autumn-Speculation/inflation, Winter-Crash/Cleanse) of roughly 60-80 years and the attached chart should be read from the bottom up and used while reading the summary below. I think it is apparent that the interest rates help show the potential long waves through time and the ebb and flow of cycles and how those rates effect other markets. According to this theory we are in our 5th winter since the Revolutionary War and it is far from over (really just begun according to the author).

Here is a summary of the notes I took below...

-Summer is always the season of inflation/interest rate peaks (latest one was the 60s/70s) and autumn of speculation (90s/2000s)
-Entering the 30s depression, the US was actually in pretty good shape. Debt was pretty low, and it was primarily govt. debt (instead of consumer). The debt/GDP ratios are misleading back in the depression because GDP fell 45%...so the main driver of the ratio peaking, wasn't debt, but was GDP dropping (denominator effect).
-It allowed for the govt. to increase its debt because it could be paid back from GDP growth (since GDP could realistically be expected to grow thru time and thus the decline by the 50s to less than 150% D/GDP). This time is different, it is debt driving the ratio of GDP and it is unclear GDP will ever get to a level that sustains the debt increase at 350% GDP.
-The winter period typically cleanses the debt that was built up during the speculative autumn period; in the 50's there was very little consumer and corporate debt (coming out of winter and entering spring)...a very conservative and scared of reverting generation-apprehensive...fuel to kickoff spring. In the previous winter season over 10,000 banks went under
-A peak in interest rates tells us that autumn is around the corner (and that interest rates will soon fall); biggest bulls occur in autumn (1980)
-The autumn period is the speculative period. It is when debt explodes because confidence is high and most assets (stocks, bonds, real estate) do well (1982-2000)
-There is typically a small recession after the summer period before autumn kicks off (1866, 1920, 1981)
-Autumn speculative themes: 1820s- midwest US land grab; Canal buildings; 1860s- railroads (many went bankrupt in the next winter); 1920's- industrial expansion/consumer starts borrowing from corps/US largest creditor; 1990s-internet boom/housing
-The fed has interefered with true stock and asset valuations...delaying the inevitable; Yes, things are different than the Great Depression, but not necessarily any better. US is now largest debtor nation when in the 20s it was the largest creditor...maybe not even richest...globalization/competition pressures...a lot larger now so growth is slower (the Microsoft effect)...
-The longwave group expects things in the future to be much worse than Great Depression because of debt...whether that is a longer time period or a deeper pain is yet to be determined...likely a combo of both. Now debt is on the consumer versus then it was on the govt which will be a major issue going forward.

Some investment themes the LongWave group holds:
-Dow 1000 expectations gotten from a number of different ways, but primarily because of the 1:1 Dow:Gold Ratio expectation that has held through time (2nd page of presentation). Gold over the long run does opposite of stocks, so basically an investment decision should be either/or not both.
-In previous winters, the market fell to almost 50% of the previous season's low...1921=Dow ~$65 and bottom at ~$40 in 1933; 1981=Dow 800 so projection =Dow 400 at winter's bottom.... which means on 30 stocks with a P/E of 5 would mean about $2.60 earnings on average per company...not sure about this methodology with fiat currencies.
-"Sure not going to see Dow 14,000 any time soon.
-"I'm convinced stock market will eventually reflect reality TPTB (the powers that be) won't be able to control forever like they have interfered the last 12 years"
-"Greenspan messed with rates and bottom should have been a lot sooner and harder after 2000 top"
-Stocks are best in Spring and autumn
-Gold is best in Winter (now) and Summer
(my 2 cents) keep in mind that it is a ratio which doesn't mean that they both can't go down...just that one will perform better than the other and/or go down less
-Every major longwave bottom had a 1:1 Dow:Gold price except the 1930s. This is because the fixed price of gold was at $20.67...if was at market would have hit 1:1 (my 2 cents: it hit 2:1 for arguments sake...so maybe that is the conservative target)
-Expects deflation and debt will overwhelm govts eventually creating a new monetary system; expects Euro to fail..similar to 30s when Austria and Britain currency status quos were upheaved
-(my question) - The timing of the waves is not near as important as the events...need to know where events occur in the cycle to know when seasons will change; things like fiat money and human lifetimes throw the timing off making it less reliable. If US was on gold standard like in the 30s would have been completely different today
-"you can predict price or you can predict time, but you cant predict both"
-Expects 2012 to be a bad year...primarily due to GANN cycles and the 20 year and 2nd year in the decade cycle (1932, 1982, 1992, 2002)

In full disclaimer he got his clients all into gold in 1999 with the expectant coming winter...he got out of stocks. he has been in gold since and will continue to hold until the Dow/Gold ratio is 1:1 (he expects to actually undershoot it because of the overshoot of the ratio in the 90s). he suggested that land, food, guns, etc will be other good investments...things to become self sustainable. Expects currencies to basically stop working and industry shuts down preventing transportation of goods, etc.